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 1 
Introduction 
Global food and agricultural governance, or the norms, rules and institutions that have 
evolved at the international level to govern the production, trade, and marketing of food and 
agriculture, is being transformed as the food system has become more globalized and as 
corporate control of that system has become more concentrated. Traditionally the domain of 
governmental and intergovernmental actors, the governance of food and agriculture is 
increasingly being not just influenced, but also ‘created’, by corporate actors via private 
governance mechanisms, such as standards and corporate social responsibility initiatives. 
While the literature has paid considerable attention to the globalization of the agro-food 
system as such and has begun to look at the role of corporations in the system, empirical 
research on private governance institutions in global food and agriculture governance is only 
just starting to emerge. There is still a great deal about these private, corporate-led governance 
structures that must be examined. We must ask who participates in the privatization of food 
governance, and whose interests are being served, to get a sense of the legitimacy of these 
new governance structures. And we must also ask what the implications are of these new 
governance forms for environmental and social sustainability. 
The objective of this paper is to develop a conceptual framework for an international 
symposium that aims to analyze the implications of the emergence of business-led private 
governance structures for both democratic legitimacy and sustainability. While the emerging 
literature on private food governance has focused largely on implications for food safety and 
quality in global food commodity chains, there is a need for a more political analysis of the 
legitimacy and accountability of such arrangements, as well as the broader sustainability 
implications. With respect to the implications of private governance institutions for the 
democratic legitimacy of food governance, the symposium will examine aspects of 
participation, transparency and accountability. In terms of sustainability, the symposium will 
investigate the impact of private governance institutions on food safety and quality, as well as 
their implications for environmental and socio-economic conditions, including farmer 
livelihoods and food security.  
 
We start from the premise that the democratic legitimacy and sustainability of the global food 
system are fundamental preconditions for the well-being of societies world-wide. Democracy 
is a major political achievement. With the shift of political decision-making to the global level 
and to non-state actors, including corporations, the question of how to maintain basic 
 2 
requirements of participation, transparency and accountability needs to be addressed. After 
all, private food governance structures are more than business practices companies use to 
organize their activities. They reflect rules and standards that have fundamental implications 
for the allocation of values and resources in society, the core business of politics. They 
embody the triumph of one rule or norm over other potential ones and may influence, replace, 
prevent or undermine public rules and norms. Accordingly, the fundamental question of how 
to create a level playing field, institute checks and balances on power, and ensure the 
accountability of those setting rules and standards in global food governance can no longer be 
neglected. 
 
The sustainability of the global food system is relevant for different yet similarly fundamental 
reasons. Both food security and food safety need to be provided for individuals to be able to 
live healthy and productive lives. At this point in time, neither food security nor food safety is 
fully ensured. Almost 860 million people suffer from hunger and 6 million people die from 
malnutrition and contaminated food and water every year. Simultaneously, those areas of the 
globe, in which the provision of a sufficient quantity of food is not a problem, have suffered 
repeated food crises and health scares due to the spread of animal diseases and irresponsible 
business practices. Moreover, the global agro-food system in its current form is associated 
with serious environmental burdens such as soil erosion, greenhouse gas emissions, and 
accumulation of toxins in the soil from chemical use, as well as with the presence of risks 
such as the potential ecological and health impacts arising from genetic modification of food 
and non-food species. Since WWII, a number of public intergovernmental governance 
institutions have been created at the international level to address the global dimensions of 
these issues, including, for example, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission, or the Biosafety Convention and Cartagena Protocol. These 
institutions have only partially succeeded in their goals, as the ongoing existence of the above 
problems indicates. 
 
Against this background, the increasing spread of private governance institutions is of pivotal 
importance. We urgently need to know to what extent these governance institutions can 
potentially help to improve the sustainability of global food governance and to what extent 
they are likely to worsen a situation that is already highly unsatisfactory. If private 
governance institutions are likely to help with some sustainability issues, but worsen others, 
we need to know which facets of sustainability are likely to trump others and which need 
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additional public governance efforts or adjustments in existing public and private governance 
institutions. Preliminary research suggests, for instance, that private standards tend to focus 
on bringing improvements to improve food safety for consumers in the North while pushing 
small and medium sized farmers in developing countries out of the market and paying little 
attention to ecological factors. This dynamic is also significant from a gender perspective as 
in most developing countries women are responsible for 60-80% of food production, i.e. they 
will be particularly affected.  
 
The aim of this symposium, therefore, is to provide impetus for the pursuit of questions 
regarding the democratic legitimacy and sustainability of private food governance, questions 
we consider highly relevant, for the future of society. To foster a wholesome, safe, and 
environmentally and socially sustainable food supply, we need to achieve major gains in 
knowledge and understanding. This symposium aims to contribute to that goal.  
 
Private Food Governance Mechanisms 
 
Today’s global food governance is characterized by an increasing role of private governance 
structures and institutions (FAO 2006). These private governance mechanisms claim to ensure 
the safety and quality of food products as well as improve environmental and social 
conditions of the food system. There is a range of private governance mechanisms in the food 
sector, including corporate social responsibility initiatives (CSR) reporting, the adoption of 
codes of conduct (CoC), and the development and implementation of private standards. These 
are sometimes developed and operated in the context of public-private and private-private 
partnerships (PPPs), with corporate actors operating with other actors, including the state and 
non-governmental organizations. Some initiatives are wholly developed by corporate actors 
and can be seen as private, industry-led standards. The central feature of these various private 
governance mechanisms is that they set out principles and criteria against which company 
performance is measured and reported upon (Blowfield 2005). Large firms operating at 
various points along the food chain in the global agri-food complex were relatively slow to 
adopt voluntary measures for corporate responsibility (Action Aid International 2004) but 
have in recent years increasingly begun to participate in such efforts.  
 
Corporate Social Responsibility efforts include measures to raise corporate awareness as well 
as reporting of business activities which touch on social, human rights, and environmental 
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themes. The idea is that such reporting will foster transparency, and ultimately improve firms’ 
performance on these fronts (Gupta, forthcoming). Firms may undertake reporting on their 
own terms, or in accordance with the guidelines for such reports as set out by the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI). The GRI, established in 2000, is a set of guidelines that seeks to 
standardize CSR reports across firms to ensure completeness and comparability, and firms 
that adhere to these guidelines can be certified as having followed these guidelines. There are 
at present around 1000 firms that report in accordance with the GRI, and a number of these 
firms are in the food and agriculture sector. These include firms at agricultural input end of 
the spectrum, as well as those in the processing and retail ends of the global food and 
agriculture industry. Although a number of firms in the agro-food industry utilize these 
guidelines, there are some notable absences, such as Walmart, which follow their own format. 
The GRI is at present developing a sector specific set of guidelines for the food processing 
sector (see www.globalreporting.org).  
 
Codes of conduct can be understood as written guidelines on the basis of which companies 
deal with their workforce, suppliers, state authorities and external stakeholders in their host 
country (Greven 2004: 142). Such codes are not necessarily ‘certifiable’, though in some 
instances they can be. One of the more general codes is the Global Compact of the United 
Nations, which was established in 1999 and when calls on participating firms to adhere to 10 
key principles for good corporate behaviour, including social and environmental 
considerations. Firms must only promise to adhere to these principles to be considered as 
participants, and must also submit reports (such as GRI formatted reports) on a regular basis 
to maintain their participant status. There are some 4000 firms as participants in the GC, 
including a number of firms in the food and agricultural sector – from the input sector to the 
retail sector (see www.unglobalcompact.org). There are also some codes that are more 
specific to the food and agriculture sector. Some producers, such as Chiquita, have codes that 
deal with labour rights. In the agricultural input industry, for example, there are codes on the 
safe handling genetically modified organisms (currently being developed), as well as codes on 
the safe use of pesticides (see Clapp, forthcoming).  
 
Private standard-setting is a more concrete form of CSR and CoC (Blowfield 2005) and this 
form of private governance has mushroomed in recent years in the food sector, particularly in 
the retail sector. Private standards are defined as rules of measurement established by 
regulation or authority (Jones and Hill 1994). Private standards tend to be voluntary in nature 
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and rely on various sorts of certification mechanisms to identify actors complying with the 
principles defined in the standard. Because these are often driven by corporations’ desire to 
increase market share by tapping into a market that cares about a particular issue, Cashore 
refers to these mechanisms as ‘non-state market driven’ governance mechanisms (Cashore 
2002). In other words, the standards, though set privately, are in a way ‘governed’ by the 
market, in that firms will want to adhere to them, and strengthen them, because being certified 
is crucial to maintain market share for products that can be guaranteed to possess certain 
characteristics or to come from certain production processes. 
 
Standards are distinguished in product and process standards. Product standards refer to 
various characteristics embodied in the product itself, for instance quality or safety. Process 
standards refer to the methods by which the product was made (or in the case of food items, 
grown). Process standards specify the characteristics that the processes are expected to have, 
either to produce products with specific attributes (organic, safe) or create and maintain 
certain conditions for the environment, workers and so on (Reardon et al. 2001). Standards 
cover a variety of issues at all levels of the food chain ranging from food safety and quality, to 
environmental management and workers’ rights. Examples of private standards in the food 
chain include the Global Food Safety Initiative, Global-Gap, International Food Standard and 
Ethical Trading Initiative. These standards are briefly discussed below. 
 
The Global Food Safety initiative was initiated in 2000 by a group of international retailers 
and global manufacturers such as Unilever. With 52 members and 65% of worldwide food 
retail revenue it aims for consumer protection and the strengthening of consumer confidence. 
Furthermore, the initiative sets requirements for food safety and intends to improve efficiency 
costs throughout the food chain.  
 
The Global Partnership for Good Agricultural Practice (Global-Gap) (known as Eurep-Gap 
until 2007) was developed in 1997 by a group of retailers belonging to the Euro-retailers 
Produce Working Group (Eurep). While initially only applying to fruits and vegetables, it 
now covers meat products and fish from aquaculture as well. Completion and verification of a 
checklist consisting of 254 questions is required in order to acquire certification. This 
checklist is divided into 41 “major musts”, 122 “minor musts” as well as 91 recommendations 
(“shoulds). Traceability and food safety are covered by major must practices while minor 
musts and shoulds include environmental and animal welfare issues.  
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The International Food Standard (IFS) is a standard developed for retailers and wholesalers to 
ensure the safety of own-brand products. It was initiated in 2002 by German food retailers 
from the HDE (Hauptverband des Deutschen Einzelhandels). In 2003, French food retailers 
(and wholesalers) from the FCD (Fèderation des entreprises du Commerce et de la 
Distribution) have joined the IFS Working Group and have contributed to development of 
subsequent versions of IFS (version 4).  
 
The Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) finally, was formed in 1998. Its aim is to develop an 
agreed baseline code of conduct covering employment conditions among companies, unions 
and NGOs, and examining how systems of monitoring and verification can be established. As 
a UK initiative, its ultimate goal is to ensure that the working conditions of workers producing 
for the UK market at least meet international labour standards. Scholars note that the ETI 
should be distinguished from fair trade or alternative trade in that it does not only cover small 
producers and it does not carry a specific seal of approval, although companies can advertise 
it if they want to (Barrientos and Smith 2006). Rather, it is based on a company applying a 
code to its suppliers in the same way as it applies other conditions of supply covering 
production and product specification (ibid.).  
 
Importantly, many of the standards are developed, operated and monitored in partnership 
either with public or other private actors. Public-private partnerships include collaborations 
between private and public actors in a particular policy area, such as the contracting of 
business actors to perform research or transfer of knowledge to specific policy fields. In the 
case of agriculture and food, examples of public-private partnerships include collaboration in 
the case of biotechnology and agricultural research and development (e.g. fertilizers, seeds, 
medication for animal health). In the US, for example, university-industry relations were 
fostered by the federal government through programs such as the 1980 Tax Reform Act which 
provided tax write-offs for industry funded university research and development on 
biotechnology (Kameri-Mbote, Wafula and Clark 2001). Next to public-private partnerships, 
private-private partnerships exist entailing the collaboration between business and NGOs, for 




With these private governance mechanisms, business actors increasingly are involved in the 
design, implementation and enforcement of rules and principles governing the global food 
system at various points in the sector from inputs to production to retail. As several critical 
scholars have noted, however, the knowledge we actually have about the impact of these 
standards and other mechanisms, especially in developing countries, is very limited 
(Blowfield 2005, 2007; Margolis and Walsh 2003). Much of the knowledge we have is based 
on few case studies and corporate self-reporting. With respect to Corporate Social 
Responsibility reporting on the part of food industry actors, however, there is concern that 
because the reporting is itself voluntary, that there is little sanction against firms that engage 
in practices that may lead to environmental or social harm. For example, a firm that engages 
in unsustainable activities may fail to report, or may report only partial information, or may 
fully disclose problems that have emerged. In any of these cases, there is no external 
mechanism to hold firms to account (Clapp, forthcoming). While the GRI guidelines for such 
reporting are becoming more explicit and specific in terms of expectations of reporting on the 
environmental and social fronts, there is no guarantee that firms will abide by them fully, and 
no public oversight in terms of ensuring that reported problems are actually rectified (see 
Clapp and Utting, forthcoming). Firms that flout the principles of the Global Compact, for 
example, face only minimal consequences. 
 
Finally, private governance institutions also raise concerns with respect to democratic 
legitimacy. Scholars emphasize, for instance, that they potentially circumvent or undermine 
international law (Haufler 1999; O’ Rourke 2003). Scholars also stress the preemptive 
character of private standards which allows companies to avoid harder and more binding state 
regulation (Beisheim 2004) and voice concerns regarding the lack of effective monitoring 
(Greven 2004). The need to scrutinize the sustainability and democratic implications of global 
food governance in its private form, then, is essential.  We discuss these points in some detail 
below.  
 
Implications for Democratic Legitimacy 
 
The increasing privatization of food governance has raised questions about democratic 
legitimacy. Private actors influence global food governance and generate rules and regulations 
that transcend national borders moving to spaces previously occupied by states (Schaller 
2007). How can we evaluate the democratic legitimacy of private governance institutions? 
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Obviously any attempt to do so with traditional notions of democracy will fail as fundamental 
democracy requirements are violated. Private actors are not elected by a relatively 
homogenous demos to govern their affairs. Yet, food safety and quality, environmental and 
social sustainability are public goods and the practices followed by corporations in the food 
sector affect the lives of millions of people. Scholars propose then, different indicators for the 
examination of democratic forms of governance beyond the state. There is substantial 
agreement that such indicators should include the dimensions of participation, transparency 
and accountability (Porter and Ronit 2007, forthcoming; Schaller 2007). As we discuss below, 
however, it is not simple to define these terms (see also Fuchs and Kalfagianni 2007, 
forthcoming). Regarding participation, for instance, different perspectives for democratic 
legitimacy propose different participation criteria. Transparency too needs to be carefully 
defined. Is it transparency in terms of procedures or in terms of outcomes that is important for 
democratic legitimacy? Finally, accountability is similarly difficult, as it can be distinguished 
in accountability in terms of internal and external auditing of standards (an interpretation 
firms prefer to adhere to) or accountability of private actors to the general public (an 
interpretation that critics of corporations prefer). We discuss these issues in the context of 
private food governance in more detail below.  
 
Participation 
Which criteria for participation should we adopt in the development (and monitoring) of 
private governance institutions? Different perspectives on democratic legitimacy provide 
different responses to this question. Here we examine the perspectives of input legitimacy, 
output legitimacy and deliberative democracy. According to input-oriented arguments, 
participation should include all the actors who are potentially affected to ensure their 
autonomy under law. Autonomy means that actors feel free under law even though 
constrained by it because it is them who have created the law in the first place. As such, 
autonomy presupposes equality as it is difficult to imagine freedom under law if it is not 
equally possible for all to participate in the positing of the law (Castoriadis 1997). Thus, from 
an input legitimacy perspective, participation is defined in terms of access of all relevant 
actors in the development of standards and equality among the actors in the decision-making 
procedures. Participation, however, can also be approached from a different perspective, one 
stressing the output side of the policy process. Such a perspective emphasizes the 
effectiveness of the specific governance institution in designing policies that promote the 
public good. The question of participation then becomes one that is determined by results.  
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Finally, in deliberative democracy central is the issue of stakeholders. Similar to the input 
legitimacy approach, participants should be those affected by the decisions. However, this 
approach pays particular attention to the quality of procedures too because it recognises that it 
influences the quality of the outputs. According to the deliberative democracy argument, 
procedures have the potential to form and transform the preferences and values of the relevant 
actors who determine the public good (Miller 1992, Phillips 1995). As such, the higher the 
quality of procedures, the higher the quality of the preferences themselves and eventually of 
the policy output (i.e. the public good) will be (Wolf 2002). In a deliberative democracy such 
procedures are discursive, in the form of uncoerced and unconstrained dialogue. From a 
deliberative democracy perspective then, participation is defined in terms of access to all 
actors potentially affected by private regulation and the deliberative quality of the decision-
making procedures.   
 
Regarding the standards presented as examples for private food governance earlier in this 
paper, participation differs in terms of access. Hence, the Global Food Safety Initiative and 
the International Food Standard restrict access to retailers and manufacturers. Participation is 
wider in the other two standards, however. Thus, Global-Gap also includes 
suppliers/producers in the development of standards. The Ethical Trading Initiative invites a 
wide range of stakeholders, including civil society associations. In terms of access then, 
multi-stakeholder initiatives fair better from input and deliberative democracy perspectives.  
 
Even in multi-stakeholder initiatives, however, participation in developing countries is 
considered problematic and North-South inequities remain (Shcaller 2007). Moreover, the 
principles of equality and deliberative potential are not fulfilled most of the time. Indeed, it is 
extremely difficult to imagine unconstrained and uncoerced dialogue taking place among the 
various interest groups associated with food governance. After all, that presupposes a level of 
equality in resources, organizing capacities and reach that can hardly be said to exist between 
a transnational corporation and a small NGO, a transnational corporation and a small farmer 
or independent store, a small and a large NGO, and so on.  
 
What about output legitimacy? If one adopts such a perspective can one really claim that 
multi-stakeholder initiatives, such as the ETI, are more effective than GFSI, for instance? The 
difficulty here is to define “effectiveness” and “the public good” in the context of global food 
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governance. Different stakeholders will define different aspects of the global food system as 
“the public good”. Thus, ETI would define effectiveness in terms of fostering workers’ rights, 
while GFSI would define effectiveness in terms of providing food safety. In a similar way, 
representatives of retail corporations and of environmental or development NGOs, for 
example, raise different demands towards private standards in general and therefore different 
benchmarks for their effectiveness. In consequence, there is no objective measure of the 
“effectiveness” of a private governance institution in providing the public good. Rather we 
can only define the public good and measure the effectiveness of its provision with respect to 
the definition and interests of certain publics. Defining participation in terms of output 
legitimacy then, is highly problematic.  
 
Transparency 
Transparency is a fundamental condition for the democratic legitimacy of private governance 
mechanisms (Gupta, forthcoming). If private actors develop their own rules, then at least these 
rules and the procedures of developing such rules should be open to public scrutiny. The lack 
of transparency can render access, even in cases where it exists, meaningless by obscuring the 
real options actors can “vote” for. Transparency is not given, furthermore, if scrutiny refers to 
technical aspects of food production only, while society relevant aspects are left out. This is 
related to the exclusion of civil society in the monitoring and implementation of standards in 
most cases. Moreover, lack of transparency further restricts control possibilities which are 
already minimal as global political processes become more complex and it is difficult to 
determine who is responsible (Zürn 1998).  
 
Do the standards described above provide transparency? To some extent the answer is 
positive. Information about the standards is provided on the web and certain documents are 
available to all. However, most of the documents related to the development and monitoring 
of standards are only available to members. In addition, information to the general public is 
only provided after decisions have been made. Finally, access to information from developing 
countries due to technological constraints is also problematic (Schaller 2007). 
 
Moreover, transparency is provided only in a narrow sense, as most of the standards strive for 
food safety while obscuring other aspects of sustainability. In that context, transparency in the 
global food system relates to the ability to trace the history of a product backward and 
forward through the entire production chain from harvest through transport, processing, 
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distribution and sale. This process is important in order to ensure the accurate and rapid 
identification of product and process information up and down the chain and therefore, be 
able to eliminate or confine a potential food safety danger. In a broader sense, however, 
transparency also covers the normative concerns of various societal actors regarding the 
environmental and social sustainability impacts of food production, for instance. Normative 
transparency is important in order to help the various stakeholders make informed choices 
based on sound sustainability criteria. Regarding the narrow conceptualisation of 
transparency, the standards presented illustrate significant efforts towards an improvement of 
traceability and food safety. In contrast, attention to sustainability in a broader sense has been 




Next to questions of participation and transparency, finally, accountability is a crucial issue 
when it comes to democratic governance (Clapp and Utting forthcoming). Most of the 
standards presented here provide internal accountability as members need to report on their 
activities on a somewhat regular basis. Regarding external accountability, civil society 
participates only in the auditing of standards which cover social aspects, such as the ETI. At 
the moment, then, accountability with respect to most of the private governance mechanisms 
in the food sector is limited (see, for example, Clapp forthcoming). Moreover, it is 
questionable why environmental sustainability issues should not be monitored by 
governmental authorities or civil society as well. This is related to the technical discourse 
surrounding environmental issues limiting control to experts. The environment, however, is a 
social issue too as the lives of hundreds of thousands of people, including indigenous peoples, 
depend on a sound environment for their survival.  
 
Regarding accountability to the general public, while public actors are not always superior as 
creators of governance institutions, it is on the issue of accountability that we find them in a 
clear advantage. Public actors (in functioning democracies) have to be accountable to more 
interests and criteria than private actors. With private governance institutions, accountability 
and mechanisms to ensure it are not predefined. Multinational business actors are at best only 
accountable to a fraction of the people affected by their activities (Zürn 2004). Moreover, 
accountability is difficult if not impossible to enforce for vague standards and CSR initiatives. 
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The same applies to many public private partnerships, such as those presented here, by the 
way.  
 
Accountability to the people in a democracy differs from accountability to the people ruled by 
a non-democratic, potentially corrupt, government, of course. Thus, one may be inclined to 
argue that in the case of a lack of democratically elected and accountable public actors, 
private governance institutions will be able to provide a more legitimate form of governance. 
As long as these private governance institutions are not held to some standard of external 
accountability, however, such an assumption does not stand on firm ground. In terms of 
accountability, however, the questions arises: Accountability to whom? And how can those 
governed be provided with sufficient support to allow them to actually enforce this 
accountability in the context of huge information asymmetries and collective action 
problems?1  
 
Implications for Sustainability 
The global food system and its governance also have important implications for the question 
of sustainability (see also Fuchs, Kalfagianni and Arentsen 2007, forthcoming). In a socio-
economic sense, over half of the world’s population is engaged in agricultural production. It 
thus provides a livelihood for a significant proportion of people on the planet. And food is a 
commodity that touches us all – we all eat, and thus are consumers of food – interacting with 
the sector either as producers of our own food, or the production of others. For these reasons 
food production and trade have important implications for socio-economic outcomes and, 
depending on their organization and distribution, can work to either enhance or detract from 
economic opportunities and social living conditions. Environmentally, agricultural production 
is intimately tied to the issues of soil, water, biodiversity and emissions to name a few.  
 
                                                 
1
 In this context, a great difficulty in ensuring the accountability of private governance institutions is that many 
countries lack the institutions that foster “individual and collective agency” (Marquez 2005). In China, where 
many of the Western retailers open new stores, for example, collective action by workers is forbidden. In 
general, collective action through unionisation has declined considerably across the world, for instance. Research 
reports that it has dropped especially sharply in Latin America, with decreased levels of unionisation by almost 
50 percent in Argentina, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela since 1980 (Sabatini and Farnsworth 2006). 
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Given the proliferation of private governance mechanisms in the area of agriculture and food, 
their effectiveness in fostering sustainability objectives becomes crucial. As we point out 
below, however, the impacts of private food governance on sustainability can be conflicting. 
In order to examine the implications of private food governance for sustainability broadly, it 
is useful to distinguish three dimensions of sustainability: food safety/food quality, 
environmental sustainability and socio-economic sustainability. Each of these three 
dimensions is crucial for the viability of any food system. As the food system becomes more 
global, and as private actors increasingly are engaged in its governance at the international 
level, we must examine each of these dimensions closely to get a better sense of the 
sustainability implications. 
 
Food Quality/Food Safety 
Food quality refers to attributes such as appearance, cleanliness and taste, while food safety 
on attributes such as levels of pesticide or artificial hormone residue, microbial presence on 
food, etc. (Reardon and Farina 2002). Scholars observe that private standards and other forms 
of supply chain governance for food safety and quality are rapidly increasing not only in 
developed but also in developing countries (Jaffee and Henson 2004; Reardon and Berdegue 
2002). A prominent food safety and quality standard next to the Global Food Safety Initiative 
and the International Food Standard mentioned above, is the hazard analysis of critical control 
points (HACCP), which has become a norm in the food sector recommended by Codex and 
required by many governments (Fulponi 2006). Moreover, scholars observe that some private 
safety and quality standards are embedded in voluntary public standards at the national and/or 
international levels (ISO 9000) (Henson and Reardon 2005).  
 
With the adoption of more stringent standards – both public and private - of food production, 
food safety has improved in developed countries over the years. In the Netherlands, for 
instance, a number of safety risks have been prevented (dioxin in 2004 and dioxin in animal 
feed in 2005). Similar incidents have been reported in Sweden and other countries. This 
improvement is however rather limited in scope as it mainly concerns prevention of unsafe 
products from reaching the consumer rather than prevention of animal diseases and other 
safety concerns from breaking out. Indeed, this latter concern is primarily related to the 
conditions of mass production that foster the development and outbreak of diseases.  
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The effects of the increasing introduction of private food standards become more ambivalent 
as we consider their implications for food quality in developing countries (and for the poorer 
sectors of society in developed countries, in fact). Optimistic observers note that higher 
standards for export markets can lead to spillover effects for domestic food safety in 
developing countries (Jaffee and Henson 2004). In addition, they point out that an emerging 
consumer class in developing countries is likely to place higher demands on food quality. 
More critical observes, however, report that emerging private standards (usually more 
stringent from public ones) lead to an increasing gap in quality between export and domestic 
food products, at the moment (Van der Grip et al. 2005). More research is required to build 
our knowledge of these developments, how the potentially positive and negative impacts 




Environmental and social standards indicate the “goodness” of production (Konefal et al. 
2005). Here, process standards are more important than product standards. Organic 
production standards, for instance, include the forbiddance of conventional pesticides, 
artificial fertilisers, ionising radiation and food additives, or antibiotics and growth hormones 
for animals. Environmental and social standards play a marginal role within the mainstream 
private food standards outlined in the first part of this paper, but private actors are 
increasingly under pressure to improve at least their environmental performance.  
 
It should be noted that the environmental standards promoted by business actors focus on 
selected elements of environmental protection or concern only a very small portion of 
production, and thus have a minimal impact on the overall environmental characteristics of 
the global food system. Tesco’s nature choice, for example, an integrated management 
scheme introduced in 1992, which sets a wide range of environmental standards2 is endorsed 
by 12,000 suppliers only (www.tescocorporate.com). Sainsbury’s Farm Biodiversity Action 
Plan which aims to promote biodiversity in farming and livestock covers merely 0.5% of the 
total agricultural land in the UK. In addition, as these standards are usually voluntary in 
nature, non-compliance does not constitute a threat to the supplier or reduce the incentive to 
                                                 
2
 These standards include rational use of plant protection products, fertilizers and manures, pollution prevention, 
use of energy, water and other natural resources, recycling and reuse of material and wildlife and landscape 
conservation and enhancement. 
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“misbehave”. Concerns have also been raised regarding the effectiveness of private standards 
and industry-led governance mechanisms at contributing to environmental protection more 
broadly (e.g. Utting 2005). The voluntary nature of such standards, their often weak goals and 
the relatively small percentage of the total production they cover raises questions regarding 
their impact on the overall environmental characteristics of the global food system.  
 
Environmental standards both at the primary producer and manufacturing levels are expected 
to gain substantial importance in the future as civil society becomes more committed to 
promoting sustainable development. Such pressures, if taken on in the context of private 
standards in the retail industry, will certainly affect methods of farming and their control 
methods. Environmental standards are also expected to affect food manufacturing practices 
with respect to energy and use of water, as well in packaging and distribution (Fulponi 2006). 
Private standards on these environmental dimensions in the food processing industry, 
however, are not yet very developed, and thus their impact thus far has been minimal in terms 
of leading to environmental improvements. 
 
Social Aspects 
Social aspects of sustainability in the context of food governance cover a wide array of very 
complex issues ranging from workers’ rights to migration and rural livelihoods, gender issues 
and food security. In this context private governance claims to substitute for weak states 
especially in developing countries that lack the capacity (and perhaps willingness) to provide 
and enforce social safety nets. Social provisions, such as worker welfare but also gender non-
discrimination and rules against sexual harassment, are included in mainstream standards (e.g. 
Ethical Trading Initiative) and companies’ codes of conduct (e.g. Chiquita Code of Conduct), 
albeit they play a secondary role compared to the current understanding of food quality. Even 
though the significance of such provisions cannot be denied, their scope is limited as they 
apply only to regular employment force. Much of the labor force in developing countries, 
however, is “flexible” working only seasonally or “informal”, comprising mostly of female 
workers who do unpaid job (Barrientos et al. 2001; Dolan 2005). Such limited scope of 
private social standards increases the gap between protected and unprotected workers 
(Barrientos et al. 2001). 
 
Likewise, scholars observe that gender issues are insufficiently covered by mainstream 
standards. More specifically, standards fail to recognize the different priorities for female 
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workers stemming from the gendered nature of women’s obligations to meet domestic and 
household commitments as well as their employment related responsibilities (Pearson 2007). 
To some extent this reflects the fact that codes are designed to ensure equal treatment of men 
and women and not the issues that affect women because of their reproductive and societal 
role (Prieto-Carron 2006). Such limitations, however, pose significant constraints for women 
as responsibility for family welfare and social provisions supporting reproductive work are 
crucial for them.  
 
Moreover, private standards have several broader societal consequences which affect rural 
livelihoods, especially in developing countries. For example, the proliferation of private 
certification schemes is seen by many to be pushing small farmers out of the market, 
particularly those operating in the developing world, in favor of large agribusiness and food 
processors, also raising concerns for food security (e.g. FAO 2006; Hatanaka et al. 2005). 
Research reports that thousands of small dairy operations have gone out of business in the 
past five years in the extended Mercosur area, because they were unable to meet new quality 
and safety standards for milk and milk products that implied large investments in equipment 
and buildings and coordination and management (Reardon et al. 2001). Similar observations 
have been made for poultry operations in Central America (op.cit.). Likewise, NGOs point 
out that hundreds of thousands of peasants in Africa will lose their living by the 
implementation of particular private standards (Global-Gap) (ActionAid 2005).  
 
In addition, capital concentration in the retail sector and the global expansion of the 
operations of the large retail chains are also threatening the livelihoods of smaller local 
retailers. With the increasing spread of the large retail chains to Eastern Europe and Asia, for 
instance, thousands of smaller, locally owned retail stores have been forced to close. This 
development also raises questions about the future operation of the organic food sector. 
Scholars, for instance, voice concerns over a trend towards the “conventionalization” of the 
organic sector which could counteract many of the sustainability benefits gained by small-
scale, low-impact agricultural production (Knudsen et al. 2006).  
 
Clearly then, there is a need for systematic analysis of the impact of private governance on 
sustainability (FAO 2006). A worsening of certain sustainability facets by private standards or 
the neglect of crucial sustainability aspects by CSR initiatives need to be addressed. In 
addition, inherent limitations of private governance institutions to foster sustainability 
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objectives also need to be examined. The symposium, therefore, will critically examine the 
implications of private governance institutions on sustainability to detect both positive and 
negative implications. Moreover, it will seek to identify strategies to reduce potential negative 
effects via public governance frameworks and institutions or the adjustment of private ones.  
 
 
Contributions of the Symposium 
 
Following this depiction of the ambivalent implications of private governance for both 
democratic legitimacy and sustainability, it is clear that there is a strong need for much more 
systematic and comprehensive analysis of the role of private governance institutions with 
respect to agriculture and food, including the political dimensions of these developments. 
There is a need for a theoretical examination of the unique nature of the food and agriculture 
sectors and the role that business actors play in their governance. Furthermore, there is a need 
for empirical case studies that examine private-led initiatives and standards and their impacts. 
Therefore, the international, interdisciplinary research workshop, for which this framework 
paper has been developed, will explore the private food governance institutions and the 
challenges to democratic legitimacy arising from them.. In addition, it will examine their 
effectiveness in promoting sustainable development. With respect to both issues, the 
workshop will seek to identify potential problems and develop promising strategies for 
improvement. Specifically, we hope that the workshop will address the following questions as 
outlined above: 
 
• What goals do private governance institutions in food and agriculture pursue? How 
effective and efficient are they?  
• What are the implications of private governance institutions in the global agro-food 
system for democratic legitimacy, specifically participation, transparency, and 
accountability? 
• What are the determinants of the implications of private governance institutions for 
economic, environmental, and social sustainability?  
• How can potential conflicts between different efficiency and sustainability objectives 
and/or the democratic legitimacy of global food governance be reduced? 
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By providing a first set of answers to these questions, the symposium will serve to guide 
future research on the topic of private governance of the global agro-food system. 
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